automated negotiation
ChargingBoul: A Competitive Negotiating Agent with Novel Opponent Modeling
Automated negotiation has emerged as a critical area of research in multiagent systems, with applications spanning e-commerce, resource allocation, and autonomous decision-making. This paper presents ChargingBoul, a negotiating agent that competed in the 2022 Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC) and placed second in individual utility by an exceptionally narrow margin. ChargingBoul employs a lightweight yet effective strategy that balances concession and opponent modeling to achieve high negotiation outcomes. The agent classifies opponents based on bid patterns, dynamically adjusts its bidding strategy, and applies a concession policy in later negotiation stages to maximize utility while fostering agreements. We evaluate ChargingBoul's performance using competition results and subsequent studies that have utilized the agent in negotiation research. Our analysis highlights ChargingBoul's effectiveness across diverse opponent strategies and its contributions to advancing automated negotiation techniques. We also discuss potential enhancements, including more sophisticated opponent modeling and adaptive bidding heuristics, to improve its performance further.
MCTS-based Automated Negotiation Agent
Buron, Cรฉdric, Guessoum, Zahia, Ductor, Sylvain
This paper introduces a new negotiating agent model for automated negotiation. We focus on applications without time pressure with multidi-mensional negotiation on both continuous and discrete domains. The agent bidding strategy relies on Monte Carlo Tree Search, which is a trendy method since it has been used with success on games with high branching factor such as Go. It also exploits opponent modeling techniques thanks to Gaussian process regression and Bayesian learning. Evaluation is done by confronting the existing agents that are able to negotiate in such context: Random Walker, Tit-for-tat and Nice Tit-for-Tat. None of those agents succeeds in beating our agent. Also, the modular and adaptive nature of our approach is a huge advantage when it comes to optimize it in specific applicative contexts.
MOANOFS: Multi-Objective Automated Negotiation based Online Feature Selection System for Big Data Classification
Said, Fatma Ben, Alimi, Adel M.
Abstract-- Feature Selection (FS) plays an important role in learning and classification tasks. The object of FS is to select the relevant and non-redundant features. Considering the huge amount number of features in real-world applications, FS methods using batch learning technique can't resolve big data problem especially when data arrive sequentially. In this paper, we propose an online feature selection system which resolves this problem. More specifically, we treat the problem of online supervised feature selection for binary classification as a decision-making problem. A philosophical vision to this problem leads to a hybridization between two important domains: feature selection using online learning technique (OFS) and automated negotiation (AN). The proposed OFS system called MOANOFS (Multi-Objective Automated Negotiation based Online Feature Selection) uses two levels of decision. In the first level, from n learners (or OFS methods), we decide which are the k trustful ones (with high confidence or trust value). These elected k learners will participate in the second level. In this level, we integrate our proposed Multilateral Automated Negotiation based OFS (MANOFS) method to decide finally which is the best solution or which are relevant features. We show that MOANOFS system is applicable to different domains successfully and achieves high accuracy with several real-world applications. Index Terms-- Feature selection, online learning, multi-objective automated negotiation, trust, classification, big data. URING the last three decades, Feature Selection (FS) has been extensively studied in Data Mining [1], [2], Pattern Classification [3], [4] and Machine Learning [5], [6]. FS is defined as the process of selecting a subset of relevant features and removing the redundant ones from a dataset for building effective prediction models. In recent years, an enormous increase in data (news, medical imaging) has been observed which allows an increase in redundant information. Even worse, the redundancy of irrelevant data has a negative impact on the performance of classification methods associated. With the rapid development of the Internet, current tremendous amounts of data up to millions or billions, can be collected for training machine learning models.
Mechanisms for Automated Negotiation in State Oriented Domains
Zlotkin, G., Rosenschein, J. S.
This paper lays part of the groundwork for a domain theory of negotiation, that is, a way of classifying interactions so that it is clear, given a domain, which negotiation mechanisms and strategies are appropriate. We define State Oriented Domains, a general category of interaction. Necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation are outlined. We use the notion of worth in an altered definition of utility, thus enabling agreements in a wider class of joint-goal reachable situations. An approach is offered for conflict resolution, and it is shown that even in a conflict situation, partial cooperative steps can be taken by interacting agents (that is, agents in fundamental conflict might still agree to cooperate up to a certain point). A Unified Negotiation Protocol (UNP) is developed that can be used in all types of encounters. It is shown that in certain borderline cooperative situations, a partial cooperative agreement (i.e., one that does not achieve all agents' goals) might be preferred by all agents, even though there exists a rational agreement that would achieve all their goals. Finally, we analyze cases where agents have incomplete information on the goals and worth of other agents. First we consider the case where agents' goals are private information, and we analyze what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. Then, we consider the situation where the agents' goals (and therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but the worth they attach to their goals is private information. We introduce two mechanisms, one 'strict', the other 'tolerant', and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency of negotiation outcomes.